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Abstract: In this study, we focus on the case of Spanish energy policy and its implications for
sustainable energy development. In recent years, Spanish legislation has changed dramatically in
its approach to sustainable energy sources. This change is despite EU and international efforts to
increase energy efficiency, and to accelerate the transition to renewable energy sources (RES) in order
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Based on the socio-technical transitions literature, this paper
assesses the role of the new legislation in this altered scenario, and analyzes the evolution of energy
production in Spain in the EU context. The results are triangulated with two expert assessments.
We find that Spanish energy policy is responding to the energy lobby’s demands for protection for
both their investment and their dominant position. This has resulted in a reduction in the number of
investors combined with a lack of trust in both local and foreign investors in the sustainable energy
sector, affecting also social innovations in energy transitions. We conclude that Spain is a particular
case of concomitance between the energy sector and political power which raises concern about the
viability of a higher level of energy sovereignty and the achievement of international commitments
regarding climate change.
Keywords: power sector; green energy; climate change; emissions reduction; sustainability transition;
energy policy; Spain
1. Introduction
There is increased public awareness of the diminishing capacity of the environment to assimilate
the impacts of human activity, and increased demands for environmental sustainability [1,2]. At the
institutional level, concern over climate change is reflected in support for energy policies and
international legal requirements such as the Kyoto Protocol, and the shift in focus from mitigation to
adaptation [3]. EU environmental policy [4–12], apart from prioritizing energy efficiency in all energy
domains, is aimed at achieving a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 values) by
2020, and an increase in RES to 20% of gross final energy consumption [13–18].
However, while there is some convergence in how EU countries are responding to climate risks,
and to the energy challenge in particular [19–24], states’ environmental and energy policies combined
with their individual market characteristics are continuing to shape the particularities of how policy
innovation, adoption, and implementation within countries is taking place [25–29]. In response to this
heterogeneity, there is a considerable body of recent research that is devoted to understanding this
socio-technical transition phenomenon, and especially from a multi-level perspective (MLP) [30–37].
Although research on understanding innovation systems is not new and since the first pioneering
works [38,39] and the first formulations of National Innovation Systems [40,41] there have been further
developments towards technological [42], sectoral [43], regional [44], and district [45] innovation
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systems, see [46] for a review, the present paper highlights the MLP to offer a descriptive model of
transition dynamics. A MLP structures the analysis at three heuristic levels—socio-technical regime,
niche, and landscape [30,31]. ‘Regime’ refers to the dominant cognitive, regulatory, and normative
structures that have emerged around a technology. ‘Niche’ defines the protected space that allows
a specific technological innovation to develop. ‘Landscape’ captures the exogenous context of a
socio-technical system. A recent development in the innovation systems literature is the focus on the
functioning of innovation systems [47–50], described in this paper as the functional approach (FA).
We consider this combination of approaches as meaningful and useful for our analysis. The study is
relevant also because, to date, the case of Spain has received little academic attention apart from the
significant contributions by Dinica [51–53] especially concerning wind energy.
Therefore, the objective of this work is to answer the question: To what extent can the recent
turn in renewable energy development in Spain—which can be seen as misaligned with EU energy
policy—be understood as a return to working with incumbent regimes through the protection of
vested political interests? To achieve our objective, following a discussion of our theoretical approach
on the functions of innovation systems (Section 2), we describe the materials and methods used in the
analysis in Section 3, and analyze the evolution of the Spanish energy system in Section 4. We focus in
particular on the role of the legal framework (Section 4.1) and market evolution (Section 4.2) based on
two expert assessments (Section 4.3). Section 5 discusses the results in a socio-technical transitions
framework, and the paper concludes in Section 6.
2. The Functional Approach
The main idea underlying the FA is that a well-functioning innovation system requires the
performance of a number of key activities. If these important activities take place, innovation
output increases. Many studies focus on how innovation systems function [54–58]. Most of these
case studies are related to specific technological trajectories, and the focus often is on emerging
technologies, and therefore, on the formative stages of innovation systems. Here, we focus on three
of the functions in [50] which influence the direction of search, market evolution and competition,
and legitimation/counteraction of resistance to change. Influence over the direction of search refers to
those factors that affect sectoral activities in relation to how they are performed, or their range, and can
be related to new knowledge developments or new regulation. Market evolution and competition
capture the uncertainty related to many aspects of market evolution and competitors’ performance,
standards setting, and articulation of demand. Finally, legitimation/counteraction of resistance to
change refers to the degree of legitimation required by the industry to achieve the legal status to
allow the delivery of goods and services to the community. It includes consideration of the means of
production of a good or service (i.e., consideration of environmental impact, etc.).
In line with the FA, if the main goal of an innovation system, wanted or unwanted by the actors,
is the development, diffusion, and utilization of innovations [59], the degree to which these goals are
fulfilled can be assessed by analyzing the system functions [58,60]. The FA provides higher flexibility
to recognize and analyze the opportunities and constraints imposed by a given innovation system.
As different agents and actors can adopt different roles it is important to retain flexibility in the main
functions rather than in categories of agents.
Functional analysis derives from the technological innovation systems and sectoral innovation
systems approaches, and the literature proposes some lists of functions [60–62]. In what follows, we
consider three functions taken from [59] which we consider are the most relevant for our analysis of the
evolution of renewable energy development. Therefore, we exclude from our analysis the functions of:
knowledge development and diffusion, entrepreneurial experimentation, and resource mobilization.
2.1. Influence on the Direction of Search
New knowledge development, new regulation, and changes to markets or competitors, are all
factors that affect activities in sectors in terms of how activities are performed, or the range of activities
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that are performed. The range of opportunities is often much broader than the resources available
for their development which requires choices to be made. As already suggested, the factors that
influence this process choice are many and varied, and taken together determine where efforts should
be directed.
2.2. Market Evolution and Competition
A clear variable in the performance of any sector is the evolution of the market and the
competition. Uncertainty prevails over several aspects even if the focus is on a mature sector such
as the energy sector where standards are established, and demand is articulated. New sources of
energy or more efficient technologies may emerge, new regulation (or absence of regulation) and the
performance of competitors are all factors that require reactions from the agents in the sector in order
to enable progression.
2.3. Legitimation/Counteracting Resistance to Change
Like any public activity, industry activity requires a certain degree of legitimation, to achieve
legal status and qualification to deliver goods and services to the community. This legitimation affects
both the goods and the services offered, and also (and increasingly) the means of their production and
transformation (efficiency, environmental impact, etc.). In mature industries, the fact that the society
in which the sector activity develops also evolves, can produce tensions that require improvements
or transformations within the industry. In this process of assessing the cost to the focal society of
an industrial activity, and the benefits it might bring, the status or legitimation of the sector can be
modified and may affect other functions (e.g., resources mobilization, market evolution, etc.)
It is worth mentioning that one limitation of applying only a partial FA is that we obtain only
a partial view of the development of renewables in Spain. However, analysis of all the functions is
beyond the scope of this research.
3. Materials and Methods
At a theoretical level, this paper builds on a socio-technical transitions approach to assessing
the role of new energy and environmental legislation in Spain, to analyze the evolution of energy
production in Spain in the EU context, with a special focus on the different sources that feed the energy
mix. We start by identifying and analyzing relevant legislation affecting the energy sector in Spain,
and the period previous to the change in policy.
We analyze the evolution of the market in order to assess the energy contribution from RES to total
final energy consumption and electricity consumption. We exploit the 2015 SHARES Tool [R1] ([R1]
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares), developed by EUROSTAT which calculates
the share of energy from renewable sources according to European Directive 2009/28/EC which is the
source of the graphs in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.
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Figure 1. Contribution of the different renewable energy resources for electricity supply in
Europe (2004–2014).
Figure 2. Contribution of the different renewable energy resources for electricity supply in
Spain (2004–2014).
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Figure 3. Contribution of renewable energy resources for electricity supply and total final energy
supply in Europe (2004–2014).
Figure 4. Contribution of renewable energy resources for electricity supply and total final energy
supply Spain (2004–2014).
Subjects for the semi-structured interviews with expert informants were contacted by e-mail
and selected based on their expert profiles. Attached to the e-mail was a letter in PDF form, and a
questionnaire in Word format. Interviewees were asked to respond to the questionnaire and fill in the
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responses on a computer before returning it as an attachment. The questionnaire covered the main
energy policy, legislation and market topics:
(Q1) In your opinion, how would you describe the recent evolution of Spanish energy policy?
(Q2) To what extent would you say that the current Spanish energy policy is aligned with the energy
policy of the European Union?
(Q3) To what extent would you say that Spain’s current energy policy will allow it to respond to its
international commitments on climate change?
(Q4) More specifically, what opinion, in terms of your kindness and opportunity, do you deserve the
following laws?
(Q4a) Royal Decree-Law 9/2013, of July 12, which adopts urgent measures to guarantee the
financial stability of the electricity system.
(Q4b) Law 24/2013, of December 26, of the Electricity Sector.
(Q4c) Royal Decree 900/2015, of October 9, which regulates the administrative, technical
and economic conditions for the supply of electric energy with self-consumption and
production with self-consumption.
(Q5) Apart from the three indicated laws, is there any other law that you consider relevant for the
present analysis?
(Q6) For each of the energy sources that we name below, and based on your level of technological
development or for another reason that you indicate, do you consider that protective
measures are required for the following sources of energy? Biomass/Coal/Wind/Natural
gas/Geothermal/Hydraulics/Marin/Nuclear/Oil/Solar (photovoltaic)/ Solar thermal
(Q7) To what extent would you say that the current legislation favors / harms the
development of the following sources of energy in Spain? Biomass/Coal/Wind/Natural
gas/Geothermal/Hydraulics/Marin/Nuclear/Oil/Solar (photovoltaic)/ Solar thermal
(Q8) What kind of actions do you think should be taken with respect to the following energy
sources? Biomass/Coal/Wind/Natural gas/Geothermal/Hydraulics/Marin/Nuclear/Oil/Solar
(photovoltaic)/ Solar thermal
(Q9) How do you assess the current electricity supply system in Spain?
(Q10)What changes could improve the electricity supply system in Spain?
(Q11)Please indicate below any other comments that I would like to make regarding the
present investigation.
We wrote to 17 experts, both from universities and from the private sector but only two of them
agreed to participate. As interviewees responded in Spanish in a word document sent by e-mail
there was no need to transcribe to select relevant fragments and translate them into English. The two
experts who agreed to respond to the questionnaire were an academic with a strong reputation in
environmental law (I1), and an industrial and mechanical engineer and director of a photovoltaic
(PV) energy company (I2). In the following sections, I1 and I2 refer to the respective interviewees,
and R1–R11 refer to the question responses.
4. Results
To identify the extent to which the recent turn in renewable energy development in Spain can be
explained by Spain’s administration policy and regulations, in this section we analyze recent legislative
changes and energy market evolution, and combine the results with the information provided by the
two expert informants which allows triangulation of our results.
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4.1. Influence on the Direction of Search
Spanish energy policy in the first decade of the 2000s has moved from strong economic support
for new facilities based on their environmental benefits, and clear compensation criteria and regulatory
guarantees which provide security for investment [63–65], to a less ambitious policy following the
economic crisis. This later policy is characterized by reduced remuneration for both existing and new
facilities, increased uncertainty related to complex technical criteria, and no guarantee of mid-term
regulatory stability in what can be understood as a change to the regime. This revised policy also
does not take account of the environmental benefits of renewable energy over conventional energy
sources (I1-R1).
The [63–65] could have been the beginning of the take-off of a Spanish photovoltaic industrial sector
with a great future; in 2009 we have manufacturers of all the necessary components, engineering,
universities specialist, etc. Both the industrial sector and citizens have opted to invest in this type of
energy. In 2008 we are among the world leaders in a sector with great capacity and growth thanks
to the development of own technologies. [However] Instead of taking advantage of this historical
situation, years later these regulations will be modified retroactively which will bankrupt the investing
citizens, and close down 90% of Spanish companies in the sector by paralyzing the domestic market to
the point of making it disappear. Only the companies able to export will survive. These Royal Decree
are the origin of what could have been a success story in our country and which has ended in a scam
involving more than 50,000 Spaniards and the publication of a series of later Royal Decrees. (I2-R5)
The first change to Spanish national legislation regarding sustainable sources of energy was in
July 2013 with an important reform to the so-called tariff deficit [66]. The rules of the game changed
which led to numerous small private investors being bankrupted. One expert described this legislation
as “Timely but bad” (I1-R4a), while the other said that “This national legislation has generated bankruptcy
in the market for PV (photovoltaic) plants that has finally been acquired mainly by financial entities and groups”
(I2-R4a). This interviewee went on: “Although not all is bad news, Spanish power companies have beaten all
historical profits records between 2009 and 2015, according to their own data” (I2-R5).
At the end of 2013, the Spanish government adopted a legislative package which among other
things, anticipated a review of the support for RES, a reduction in remuneration for transmission and
distribution activities, and increased network access tariffs for consumers [67,68]. It was described by
an interviewee as a “timely but not a good law, as it does not protect the investor in renewables and does not
include environmental protection among the criteria applicable to their remuneration” (I1-R4b).
Finally, and after several contested drafts, in October 2015 new legislation was passed [69] which
imposed additional fees to discourage the use of batteries or other storage systems by households and
small companies that produced their own (mainly solar) electricity and were connected to the national
power grid. This new legislation is seen as threatening renewable energy developments and energy
sovereignty in Spain. It was described by one of our experts as “necessary to regulate the issue but not
good because it does not promote self-consumption” (I1-R4c), while the other stated that “All the necessary
obstacles are introduced via regulation, so that only a few can comply with the law; this regulation definitely
removes any possibility of Spaniards taking advantage of the sun, even in the absence of legislative assistance”
(I2-R4c).
4.2. Market Evolution and Competition
Market evolution in both Europe and Spain has been affected by a change in the landscape, i.e.,
the 2008 economic crisis. This affected the energy sector in several ways, and especially the demand
side and investments in plant. This section provides an overview of those trends:
In Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 it should be noted that:
- Energy units are ktoe (thousands of tons of oil equivalent, 1 tep = 4.1868·1010 joule)
- Hydro excludes pumping.
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- Solar includes solar PV and solar thermal generation.
- Other renewables includes electricity generation from gaseous and liquid biofuels, renewable
municipal waste, geothermal, and tide, wave, and ocean.
- RES-ELECTRICITY (in ktoe) is electricity from renewable sources
- RES-ELECTRICITY (%) is the ratio of RES-ELECTRICITY to total electricity consumption as
a percentage.
- TOTAL RES (in ktoe) is total final energy consumption from renewable sources
- TOTAL RES (%) is the ratio of TOTAL RES-ELECTRICITY to total final energy consumption as
a percentage.
Figure 1 shows that in Europe (EU28), the growth in electricity production from RES since 2009 is
due mainly to wind and solar sources. Wind electricity generation has grown almost continuously
over the whole period, with solar electricity generation taking off in 2010. Other RES of electricity
remained stable over the period analyzed.
Figure 2 depicts the case of Spain, and shows the contribution of wind and solar renewable
sources to growth in electricity production from RES after 2008. Growth in wind electricity generation
was fairly continuous up to 2013 but shows almost no growth in 2014. Solar electricity generation took
off in 2008 and shows a decline at the end of the period. The remaining RES electricity generation is
mostly stable during the whole period with the exception of hydroelectric which shows some slight
variations over the period.
Figure 3 shows that in total final energy supply for Europe, the contribution of RES in 2014 (16%)
almost doubled in relative terms over 2004 (8.9%) values.
For total final energy supply for Spain, Figure 4 shows that the contribution of RES in 2014 (16.2%)
was almost double in relative terms, the 2004 (8.5%) value. We observe a significant peak in total RES
contribution in 2010 due mainly (see Figure 5) to the considerable PV installations made in 2008, and
the significant wind power installed in 2007–2009.
Figure 5. Yearly installed electric power for the different renewable energy resources in Spain
(2000–2015). The graph in Figure 5 is based on data from the Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro de
la Energía (IDAE) [R2]. Figure 5 shows the evolution from 2000 to 2015 of new annual installed nominal
power for the different renewable technologies. [R2] http://informeestadistico.idae.es/t10.htm.
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Figure 5 shows that there was a reduction in annual RES installed power during the economic crisis
(2008–2012), and a sharp drop in annual RES installed power due to legislation changes (2012–2014)
which eliminated the economic incentives for producing electricity from RES.
Figure 6 shows that RES-ELECTRICITY (ktoe) doubled over the period; since total electricity
supply (consumption) in 2014 is slightly lower than the 2004 value, this works to magnify the growth
in the contribution of RES-ELECTRICITY (%) (in relative terms).
Figure 6. Contribution of the different renewable energy resources for electricity supply in
Spain (2004–2014).
4.3. Legitimation/Counteracting Resistance to Change
The case of Spanish energy policy seems to be a case of transition in the mid-2000s from a policy
aligned to EU policy, to one of protecting the niche development of RES technologies, to a scenario
of lobby born socio-technical regime changes to abort these developments. In this section, based on
the evidence presented above and information from our interviews, we describe the struggle between
change and resistance.
The interviews show that Spanish energy policy has become reactionary and conservative toward
certain RES, and is becoming more remote from EU policy. It is “very aggressive towards the generators
of renewable electricity accessible to small and medium companies and exclusively focused on the protection
and maintenance of the market in the hands of large electric corporations” (I2-R1). “Spanish policy is not in
line with European Union policy, as renewable energy is the central element of the EU energy policy and it is
considered justified to promote it economically in the long term because of its environmental benefits, and to
reduce energy dependence. However, currently in Spain this long term vision does not exist and the only concern
is for the [ . . . ] short term” (I1-R2). This also reflects the incoherence between political discourse and
policy: “political discourse attempts to align itself with that of the European Union, legislation and facts are
contrary to European directives, both in energy generation and energy saving” (I2-R2).
Regarding the extent to which current Spanish energy policy is allowing a response to international
commitments on climate change, one interviewee told us “I do not think that international commitments
on climate change can be met” (I1-R2).
When asked about protection, the responses of our experts differed. One believed that all RES
protection measures are needed (I1-R6) while the other commented in relation only to PV that niche
protection was no longer necessary: “It is not necessary, at the moment it is competitive with the prices of
the electric companies without aid, and this is the reason why the current regulation of self-consumption PV
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has introduced taxes and complications in the regulation that compensate for the lack of competitiveness of the
electricity distribution companies” (I2-R6).
When asked about the energy sources favored by the regulatory system in Spain only coal was
mentioned, and by one interviewee. However, the other stressed that the criteria used to judge the
effect of the regulation should not be renewable vs. non-renewable but rather whether the investment
needed is modest or large. If there is a need for major investment then oligopolistic companies will be
protected, and no further regulation will be required (or lobbied for). However, if a small investment
is enough to threaten the status quo, then there will be demands for legislation to put a stop to these
efforts. One of our experts said that:
The classification of renewable and non-renewable energy is an important concept for the medium-term
planning of the Spanish or European Union energy system but it does not correctly reflect or define
the positions that face the different actors currently in Spain. We can check the aggressiveness of
electricity companies with photovoltaic self-consumption, which is not the case with nuclear, coal,
natural gas (combined cycle power plants), wind power, or hydropower. What is the difference? The
last two are also renewable. The difference is investments, large corporations prefer sources in which
a large investment is needed which excludes small investors or companies. Wind and hydro are
renewable but on a small scale are not profitable, only large facilities within the reach of very few
companies or investors can achieve competitive costs. Photovoltaic has no scale effect, it is equally
efficient for 100 W and for 1 MW, it is accessible with very small investments and is also delocalized.
These characteristics are not the most adequate for the business model of the electricity companies and
this is the main reason justifying their rejection. (I2-R7)
When asked about the actions required in relation to different sources of energy our interviewees
responded as follows:
• Biomass: “Promote, which in our case would not hamper its competition with distribution companies”
(I2-R8);
• Coal: “Reconvert to another type of energy generation depending on the possibilities of the area. In any
case, do not import coal” (I2-R8);
• Wind: “Facilitate entry of competition into generation” (I2-R8);
• Natural gas: “Close the excess [installed power] and whoever decides to build [new infrastructure should]
assume the costs. We have an excess of installed power that we, citizens, are paying for when being stopped.
It is an intolerable protectionism and discriminatory for renewables” (I2-R8);
• Geothermal: “I do not have information. If it is competitive it should have no difficulties” (I2-R8);
• Hydroelectric: “Same rules as with other renewables. It is the renewable source that has the greatest
environmental impact and which has a better image, the majority in the hands of the big companies that
have received it cheap or for free, a very important instrument to manipulate the market of the electric
pool [ . . . ] little to do since there is no possibility of any competition. It should be state-owned, just as
originally” (I2-R8);
• Tidal/wave: “I do not have information.” (I2-R8);
• Nuclear: “Do public audits and do not do business with security. The problem of nuclear is the price, no
new plants are installed as the cost of kWh generated is more expensive than from other sources, including
solar PV. It is not a security problem; it is simply cost. In Spain, it is economical for the electricity companies
since the consumers pay them, the electricity companies get it for free [ . . . ] that is to say, the cost of the
kWh of a Spanish nuclear is related to operation and maintenance since the other costs are paid. In addition,
the external costs arising from the treatment of radioactive waste are costs borne by the state, in short,
a good business for the electricity companies and bad business for the citizen. Besides, there is the risk of an
accident, it’s absurd” (I2-R8);
• Oil: “Reduce oil imports as much as possible and promote a change to other indigenous and renewable
sources. Oil is close to not being competitive as a source of energy for transport or electricity generation,
in addition to the problems of climate change” (I2-R8);
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• Solar (photovoltaic): “Allow and facilitate free installation connected to the grid or isolated. A solar
equipment manufacturer pays its corresponding VAT and the owner is entitled to benefit from its operation
without having to pay a third party” (I2-R8);
• Solar thermal: “To promote its implementation, it is profitable, does not need aid” (I2-R8).
In relation to the current electricity supply system in Spain, both our experts agreed that is “fine”
or even “of good quality” but also “more expensive than it should be” because:
“Competition improves markets, the Spanish electricity system has no competition, nor does it admit
that a consumer can produce part of its energy. Without competition, no improvement is possible. It
is curious that we are discussing that the electricity companies collected 3000 million more for a cost
labelled ‘Costs of transition to the market of the competition’ and that even so, we cannot compete
freely with a PV system in our houses.
Former Minister Nadal justified the so-called ‘Tax on the Sun’ as solidarity to avoid raising the price
for those unable to install solar panels in their homes. If I buy a solar installation paying a 21% VAT,
I pay taxes, how can you justify charging a tax for the generation of 1 kW produced from my solar
panel, which passes through my cable and feeds my refrigerator? What will I be fined for using a solar
panel in my house? It looks like a fiction, but it’s Spain.”
5. Discussion
As the above evidence suggests, Spanish national legislation regarding sustainable sources of
energy has undergone radical changes in relation to the promotion of renewables. Spanish energy
policy has moved from strong economic support in the mid-2000s for new facilities based on their
environmental benefits, to a policy characterized by reduced remuneration for both existing and
new facilities, making self-consumption more difficult, and increasing uncertainty related to complex
technical criteria and lack of guarantees of mid-term regulatory stability [70]. For instance, in its
2016 report, the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, ([71], p. 19) claims that “There is a lack
of investor confidence in a number of significant countries because of past political events or energy policy
decisions, from Ukraine to Spain, and Argentina to Greece” and ([71], p. 25) “Spain, scene of particularly
painful retroactive revenue cuts imposed by the government during the 2011–14 period, and the end of all
support for new projects, saw investment of just $573 million in 2014. This was marginally up on the previous
year but miles below the $23.6 billion peak of 2008”. This legislation ignores the environmental benefits
compared to conventional energy sources. Thus, Spanish energy policy has diverged from EU energy
and environmental policy, and there is incoherence between Spanish political discourse and Spanish
policy. We have presented the energy market evolution in Europe and Spain, and the effects of this
policy change during the transformation of the landscape which was the result of the 2008 economic
crisis. In Spain in particular, the new policy has had an effect on energy sector new investment as
indicated by ([72], p. 22) “Spain’s wind energy sector recorded its lowest-ever annual growth in 2011 according
to the Spanish Wind Business Association. A total of 1903 MW is currently registered but is still waiting to
begin operations, and around half of pipeline capacity will have problems in being built. The current stagnation
in the market, as a result of heavily reduced subsidies in recent years, signals poor growth prospects in the
short to medium term”. We have highlighted the changes to legislation, and the evolution and ultimate
collapse of investment in RES (annual RES installed power) in Spain from 2013. However, other factors
might affect, for instance if the wind-rich sites (above 12 m/s annual average) in Spain have been
almost exhausted by 2008–2009 [53], it could partially explain the evolution of the contribution of wind
renewable sources to growth in electricity production from RES after 2008.
Following a context of protection for niche RES technology developments especially PV, the change
in legislation during the early 2000s can be understood only as a reactionary move to protect the
well-established electric oligopoly which is lobbying at the political level to maintain the status quo.
This type of strategy which can include various distinctions such as instrumental, discursive, material,
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and institutional forms of power, has been reported within the MLP, for the case of the UK [73].
We showed that although renewables no longer need a protected space for niche developments,
they do need a fair framework in order to strengthen the key processes (functions) of their innovation
system [74,75]. All these developments have taken place despite EU and international efforts to increase
energy efficiency and accelerate a transition to RES in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
A similar strategy has been observed in the UK [73] in Germany [76] and also Japan [77]. In the Spanish
case, those changes were introduced during a time of economic crisis and contraction in demand.
As [77] suggests, energy policy under Rodriguez Zapatero’s mandate was directed more towards
nurturing protected niches, whereas (see [51,52] for a more in-depth description of the political context
until 2010) with Rajoy, it turned into working with incumbent regimes as established socio-technical
regimes seeking self-reproduction through vested political interests. It remains to be seen what will
happen when demand recovers. In the meantime, the image and legitimation of the energy sector is
being eroded and bringing about change as more of the population realize how these changes will
affect other functions (e.g., resource mobilization, market evolution, etc.).
Although it seems clear that the purpose of this legislation was to revert or at least severely limit
the growth and expansion of RES, especially for small ‘prosumers’ (i.e., producers and consumers
of renewable energy [78]) there is also evidence that there is resistance to this new legislation both
from the regions and from citizen’s initiatives. Firstly, two years after the Spanish Government
prohibited the shared self-consumption [69], the constitutional court partially gave the reason to the
Generalitat de Catalunya, which in February 2016 appealed part of the articles of the RD for invasion of
competences, and has declared several of the articles null, opening the door to shared self-consumption
in residential buildings, housing developments, etc., in all Spain [79]. Secondly, renewable energy
supplying cooperatives (REScoops) that collectively own renewable energy production facilities and
supply this to their members [80] have shown dramatic increases in membership. Take for instance
Som Energia SCCL, which has been defined as collective and politically motivated renewable energy
projects by [81], and was established in 2010, it has grown from 17,000 members in late 2014 to 45,000
in early 2018 [81,82].
Further research on the Spanish case should analyze the effect of this policy on the resilience of
REScoops and on how citizens cope with energy transition and the adoption of renewable energy
in Spain. In fact, the 265% increase in Som Energia SCCL membership over four years can be seen
as citizenry reaction to the government’s return to working with incumbent regimes through the
protection of vested political interests, as the classic ‘union make force’.
Further research must also consider frequent cases of ‘revolving doors’, i.e., the movement of
personnel between roles as legislators and regulators on the one hand, and members of the industries
affected by the legislation and regulation, which in the case of the Spanish energy sector involves as
many as 26 cases [83], or the way consumers have to pay the failure of carbon capture and storage
investments, such as in Castor [84]. It will be interesting to discover whether instead of it being States
that choose their energy strategies depending on their pattern of industry-state interaction, at least in
the case of Spain, it becomes patterns of industry-ruling party interaction that best explain so-called
‘institutional capacity’ [77].
6. Conclusions
Drawing on a multi-level perspective and a functional approach to the study of socio-technical
transitions we focused in this paper on the case of Spanish energy policy, and its implications for
sustainable energy development. In line with the socio-technical transitions literature, we analyzed
the evolution of energy production, and assessed the role of new legislation in this changed scenario,
triangulating the results with expert assessments. Our results show that, in recent years, Spanish
legislation on sustainable sources of energy has changed the socio-technical regime dramatically.
These changes have resulted in less ambitious policy during the economic crisis, characterized by
increased hurdles for small investors in PV, and general uncertainty based on complex technical criteria
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and lack of guarantees of mid-term regulatory stability. All of this is considered a threat to renewable
energy developments and energy sovereignty in Spain fueled by the resistance and resilience of fossil
fuel regimes. To reverse this adverse renewable technologies situation, higher economic support,
regulatory stability, social innovations and a ‘prosumers’ facilitating policy are needed. We can finally
answer our research question affirmatively, this is to say that the recent turn in renewable energy
development in Spain, besides being misaligned with EU energy policy, can be understood as a return
to working with incumbent regimes through the protection of vested political interests.
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